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CORPORATE COUNSEL: ROLES AND LIABILITIES-AN
ESSAY FOR PROFESSOR WALTER STEELE
MARC I. STEINBERG*
T AM DELIGHTED to participate in this Dedication to Profes-
sor Walter Steele. Professor Steele is an accomplished
scholar, teacher, and practitioner. His legal career is an impres-
sive one, superbly serving key constituencies of the legal
community.
Unlike many of my colleagues who have known Professor
Steele for decades, I became acquainted with Walter upon my
joining the SMU Law School Faculty in 1989. Since that time,
our friendship has developed as we have served together as col-
leagues on the faculty, as participants in continuing legal educa-
tion programs, and as expert witnesses in our consulting work.
In these endeavors, Professor Steele represents the "best" of the
legal profession, particularly with respect to his astute legal acu-
men as well as his outstanding ability to perceive and analyze the
"real" issues.
Professor Steele's retirement from full-time teaching is a huge
loss for our faculty and students. As a classroom teacher, Profes-
sor Steele is widely admired. But as a faculty member, I will per-
sonally miss Walter's willingness to communicate his opinions
and ideas with candor and humor, stating his positions with con-
viction and integrity.
Walt, I miss you on our full-time faculty. I hope that for the
next several years you will continue to contribute to our law
school and the wider legal community. We need you. My
warmest congratulations on this well deserved dedication from
the SMU Law Review Association.
The subject of this essay focuses on the corporate and securi-
ties attorney. This topic is an important and timely one. Busi-
ness lawyers play an essential role in the integrity of our nation's
* Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law and Senior Associate Dean for
Academics, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
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entrepreneurial mission, serving as the "passkey" or the "red" or
"green" light to the consummation of financial transactions.
Investors and the marketplace rely upon the competence and
integrity of counsel to perform this significant function. Society
also embraces the business lawyer's independence and use of his
professional judgment to help promote the client's objectives in
a legally permissible manner. Unduly exposing attorneys to liti-
gation when their clients' deals disintegrate is detrimental to
our societal interests. Counsel is not a guarantor. But neither
should she escape responsibility for her neglect or fraud. 2
As a general proposition, the business lawyer proffers advice
and drafts documents that are fundamental to our economy.
Although he does not do so within the confines of litigation, the
atmosphere frequently is tense. Whether a particular transac-
tion is successfully consummated may significantly depend on
the attorney's acumen. At times, counsel may be pushed by her
clients to short-circuit due diligence or to draft less than full
disclosure documents.' The presence of counsel to withstand
See MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE AND SECURITIES MALPRACTICE 157 (1992);
Samuel H. Gruenbaum, Corporate/Securities Lawyers: Disclosure, Responsibility, Liabil-
ity to Investors, and National Student Marketing Corp., 54 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 795,
804 (1979); Morgan Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil
Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 O-o ST. L.J. 231
(1973).
2 See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th
Cir. 1986); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Nat'l
Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp 682, 713-714 (D.D.C. 1978).
s See In re Fields, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,407, at
83, 175 n.20 (SEC 1973), affd without opinion, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(stating that a securities attorney "works in his office where he prepares prospec-
tuses, proxy statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our
staff, the financial community, and the investing public must take on faith"). See
also, Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990),
where Judge Sporkin inquired:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now assert-
ing their rights under the Fifth Amendment, when these clearly im-
proper transactions were being consummated?
Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from
the transactions?
Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these
transactions were effectuated?
What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional tal-
ent involved (both accounting and legal), why at least one profes-
sional would not have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching
that took place in this case.
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this pressure4 is a matter that business attorneys must face with
some frequency. Yet the fabric of the American capitalist system
is interwoven with the lawyer's professionalism to stand firm
when so confronted. The integrity of our capital markets, pre-
mised on adequate disclosure as well as the need for investor
protection, demands that sufficiently clear legal principles be set
forth that implement these important objectives.'
A delicate balance thus should be reached. Counsel should
not be subject to "second-guessing" with the spector of hindsight
when his client's investors search for a "deep-pocket" to recoup
their losses. But neither should counsel be entitled to avoid re-
sponsibility by raising the ghosts of "strike suit" litigation where
there are genuine issues present involving attorney misconduct.6
This essay inquires whether Texas and federal law have reached
an appropriate accommodation.
With respect to Texas law, attorney-client privity still is re-
quired in order to institute a lawyer malpractice action.7 Such
an approach, representing a distinct minority position,' is out-
of-date with the coming of the 2 1st century. Turning to the prin-
ciples of Ultramares,9 authored by Justice Cardozo nearly seven
decades ago, the lack of privity should not preclude recovery
where it is specifically foreseeable that known third parties will
be relying on the professional's conduct.10 Perhaps implicitly
recognizing the shortcomings of strict privity, the Texas
Supreme Court recently held that a non-client may pursue an
action for negligent misrepresentation against a subject attor-
4 "The presence to withstand the pressure" is a phrase I attribute to my friend
Marc Dorfman, a superb securities attorney who practices in Washington, D.C.
5 See Richard M. Phillips, Client Fraud and the Securities Lawyer's Duty of Confiden-
tiality, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 823 (1992).
6 See Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate
Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REv. 225 (1996); Marc I. Stein-
berg, Attorney Liability for Client Fraud, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1 (1991).
7 See, e.g., Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996); Poth v. Small, Craig,
& Werkenthin, L.L.P., 967 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied);
Gamboa v. Shaw, 956 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.).
8 See Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 579 (Cornyn, J., dissenting) ("By refusing to recog-
nize a lawyer's duty to beneficiaries of a will, the Court embraces a rule recog-
nized in only four states, while simultaneously rejecting the rule in an
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions.")
9 See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
10 This view of Ultramares was recognized by the New York high court in Credit
Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493
N.Y.S.2d 435, 443 (1985). Both Ultramares and Credit Alliance concerned alleged
accountant negligence.
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ney, adopting the theory advanced by the American Law Insti-
tute's (ALI) Restatement (Second) of Torts.1" Within the
confines of this approach, 12 counsel may be subject to liability
premised on negligent misrepresentation "when information is
transferred by an attorney to a known [non-client] party for a
known purpose." 3 Now that this approach has been adopted by
the Texas Supreme Court, 4 the arguable unfairness present in
requiring attorney-client privity for malpractice actions has been
ameliorated. 5
11 See McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1999); see also First Nat'l Bank of Durant v. Trans Terra Corp.,
142 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 1998); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552
(1977).
12 As set forth by § 552 of the ALI Restatement (Second) of Torts:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employ-
ment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary inter-
est, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsec-
tion (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or
in a substantially similar transaction.
13 F.E. Appling, 991 S.W.2d at 794. The Texas Supreme Court's use of the term
"transferred" should be limited by the preceding sentence which states that the
ALI Restatement's "formulation limits liability to situations in which the attorney
who provides the information is aware of the nonclient and intends that the non-
client rely on the information." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 552 cmt. h (1977).
14 See id.; see also Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439,
442 (Tex. 1991). Adhering to the Restatement's definition, the Texas Supreme
Court in Sloane in a case not implicating attorney liability, set forth the elements
of a negligent misrepresentation cause of action as follows:
(1) the representation is made by a defendant in the course of his
business, or in a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest;
(2) the defendant supplies "false information" for the guidance of
others in their business; (3) the defendant did not exercise reason-
able care or competence in obtaining or communicating the infor-
mation; and (4) the plaintiff suffers pecuniary loss by justifiably
relying on the representation.
Id.
15 Note that in Barcelo, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that attorney-client
privity was required in an attorney malpractice action based on the following:
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In other respects, Texas law generally balances the interests of
investor redress and attorney liability in an appropriate manner.
For example, in given situations, attorneys may be subject to lia-
bility for fraud, 6 aiding and abetting, 7 conspiracy, 8 and failure
to warn.' 9 Pursuant to the Texas Securities Act, lawyers who en-
gage in investor solicitation (and therefore outside of the stan-
dard fare of attorney activities) may be deemed "sellers," thereby
incurring liability exposure with respect to material misrepre-
sentations (and half-truths) in the sale of securities.2 ° Attorneys
who recklessly draft documents central to a securities transac-
tion, such as an offering memorandum, may be liable as aiders
and abettors.2' Hence, under Texas law, provided that the req-
(1) potential tort liability to third parties would create a conflict
during the estate planning process, dividing the attorney's loyalty
between his or her client and the third-party beneficiaries; (2) the
privity requirement will ensure that attorneys may in all cases zeal-
ously represent their clients without the threat of suit from third
parties compromising that representation; and (3) [w]ithout this
"privity barrier" . . . clients would lose control over the attorney-
client relationship, and attorneys would be subject to almost unlim-
ited liability.
Trans Terra Corp., 142 F.3d at 810 (quoting Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 577-579). The
Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, believed that the Texas Supreme Court's con-
cerns in Barcelo did not extend to the negligent misrepresentation claim at bar.
This perception proved correct. See FE. Appling, 991 S.W.2d at 787.
16 See, e.g., TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE § 27.01; DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref d), 612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1981);
RONALD E. MALLEN &JEFFERY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.8 (3d ed. 1989).
17 See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 928 S.W.2d 133, 153 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 981 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1998).
18 See, e.g., Ross v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 892 S.W.2d 119, 132 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994), reh'g overruled, 933 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied); Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d
468, 471 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). See generally David J.
Beck, Legal Malpractice in Texas, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 547, 776-779 (2d ed. 1998).
19 See Parker v. Carnahan, 772 S.W.2d 151, 157 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989,
writ denied) (stating that "an attorney can be held negligent where he fails to
advise a party that he is not representing them on a case where the circumstances
lead the party to believe that the attorney is representing him").
20 See TEX. SEC. ACT Art. 581-33A(2); Lutheran Brotherhood v. Kidder Peabody
& Co., Inc., 829 S.W.2d 300, 306 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, vacated as moot,
840 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1992). See also Marshall v. Quinn-L Equities, Inc., 704 F.
Supp. 1384, 1391 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
21 See TEx. SEC. ACT Art. 581-33F(2). In unusual situations, attorneys and their
law firms may incur liability as control persons. See id. at 581-33F(1). See infra
note 38.
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uisite elements of a subject claim may be proven, attorneys are
subject to liability to non-clients.22
This approach makes good sense. When an attorney acts in
her lawyerly role in a negligent manner, permitting recovery to
all foreseeable victims (such as all investors in a public offering)
is unduly severe. The prospect of liability based on negligence
to an "indeterminate class, ' 23 in the words ofJustice Cardozo, ill
serves the attorney-client relationship, including the attorney's
loyalty to his client and the exercise of counsel's independent
judgment. Also of concern is the public interest in not unduly
subjecting attorneys to liability premised on negligence by hind-
sight.2 The Restatement's approach appropriately balances the
competing interests.25 Where, however, the attorney steps out
of her "lawyerly role" or acts with reckless or intentional miscon-
duct, different considerations apply. In such circumstances, by
acting as entrepreneurs or with reckless disregard, attorneys
should not be accorded privileged treatment. Rather, the appli-
cable legal standards should extend to such lawyers like any
other defendant.
Federal law is more restrictive than Texas law with respect to
the ability of private complainants to seek redress under the se-
curities laws.26 The key difference for the purposes of this essay
is that aider and abettor liability may not be imposed under the
22 See generally Alan R. Bromberg, Civil Liability under Texas Securities Act § 33
(1977) and Related Claims, 32 Sw. L.J. 867 (1978); Keith A. Rowley, The Sky Is Still
Blue in Texas: State Law Alternatives to Federal Securities Remedies, 50 BAYLOR L. RE-v.
99 (1998); Marc I. Steinberg, The Texas Securities Act: A Plaintiffs Preferred Route?,
58 TEX. B.J. 1096 (1995).
23 See Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 444.
24 For an expansive approach that may be perceived as unduly onerous in the
context of attorney liability for negligence, see Zendell v. Newport Oil Corp., 544
A.2d 878, 881 (N.J. 1988) (applying H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138
(N.J. 1983)). For further discussion, see Steinberg, supra note 1, at .12-25; Steven
K. Ward, Developments in Legal Malpractice Liability, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 121 (1990).
25 See supra notes 11-15, 24 and accompanying text.
26 This assertion does not extend to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) which has significant authority to pursue enforcement actions against
allegedly violative attorney misconduct under the federal securities laws. Such
actions include those for injunctive relief, cease and desist orders, rule 102(e)
disciplinary proceedings, and civil money penalties. In addition, the SEC has
authority to bring actions against aiders and abettors for violations of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act. See Exchange Act § 20(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (1994). For fur-
ther discussion, see MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE:
FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT (1985 & 1998 Supp.).
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federal securities laws in private actions. 27 In the attorney liabil-
ity context, the crucial issue thus is drawing an appropriate dis-
tinction between primary and secondary conduct.28
It is relatively clear that certain conduct will subject an attor-
ney to primary liability exposure. For example, the rendering of
an attorney opinion letter invokes primary liability principles.29
Affirmative representations or statements made by a lawyer to a
non-client likewise is deemed primary conduct. 30 Stated in dif-
ferent terms, although counsel may not have the duty to disclose
financial information about his client to another, once counsel
elects to do so, "he assumes a duty to provide complete and non-
misleading information with respect to subjects on which he un-
dertakes to speak."31
Courts, however, are divided when the attorney's or law firm's
conduct is the drafting of the client's materially misleading dis-
closure documents, where such documents are provided by the
client to investors. 2 In such circumstances, the law firm has no
27 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
184 (1994) (holding that § 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not provide for the
imposition of aiding and abetting liability in private actions). The court's ration-
ale precludes the imposition of aiding and abetting liability in private actions
brought for other alleged federal securities law violations. See MARC I. STEINBERG,
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAw 238 (2d ed. 1996). Likewise, relying on Central
Bank, courts have rejected liability in private actions premised on conspiracy. See,
e.g., Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837,
843 (2d Cir. 1998).
28 A number of recent law review articles have addressed the issue of primary
liability under Section 10(b). See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Chasing the Rogue
Professional After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 50 SMU L. REv.
91 (1996); Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Liabilities of Lawyers and Ac-
countants Under Rule lOb-5, 53 Bus. LAw. 1157 (1998); Ann Maxey, Competing Du-
ties? Securities Lawyers' Liability After Central Bank, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2185
(1996); Robert A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line
Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REv. 691
(1997); Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers, 50
SMU L. REv. 383 (1996).
29 See, e.g., Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994); Acker-
man v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991). Of course, the inclusion of an
attorney's opinion letter in an issuer's registration statement subjects the attorney
to Securities Act § 11 liability exposure as an expert. See § 11(a) of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). See generally S. FitzGibbon & D. Glaser, Legal Opin-
ions (1992); Darrel A. Rice & Marc I. Steinberg, Legal Opinions in Securities Trans-
actions, 16J. CoRP. L. 375 (1991).
30 See, e.g., Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478 (5th Cir. 1997).
31 Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
32 This scenario also is referred to as whether counsel has a duty to blow the
whistle on his client. See e.g., Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797
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direct communication with the investors and its name and signa-
ture may appear nowhere in the documents. Accordingly, inves-
tors are unaware of the law firm's role. 3 Prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver, which re-
jected aider and abettor liability in private actions under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,34 this type of alleged mis-
conduct frequently was viewed in secondary liability terms.3 5 In-
deed, one appellate court, rejecting primary liability principles
in this context, perceived one well known law firm as a "scriv-
ener" of its client's disclosure materials. 6
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
authority to pursue aiders and abettors today,37 private claim-
ants normally must rely on primary liability principles.3 ' Assert-
ing that the Central Bank decision does not preclude secondary
actors from being primarily liable under Section 10(b),39 attor-
neys who allegedly draft fraudulent disclosure documents are
F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986). Both the American Bar Association's Model Rules
and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct decline to mandate
such disclosure (and the ABA Rules in fact forbid such disclosure unless substan-
tial bodily harm is threatened). Nonetheless, by continuing to remain in the
representation with knowledge that fraud is afoot, the attorney may violate the
ethical rules by providing assistance to such client. See ABA Model Rules 1.2, 1.6,
1.13; Texas Disciplinary Rules 1.02, 1.05, 1.12. See also, Bernstein v. Portland Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 850 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
33 Compare Walco Invs., Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F. Supp. 1576 (S.D. Fla. 1995), with
Lycan v. Walters, 904 F. Supp. 884 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
34 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
35 See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on
other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989); M. Steinberg, supra note 1, at 74 (stating that
"[s]ecurities attorneys all too often find themselves alleged to be aiders and abet-
tors of their client's or a third party's securities fraud").
36 See Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 497 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
law firm "did no more than 'paper the deal' or act as a scrivener for [its client]").
37 See note 26 supra.
38 In rare situations, controlling person liability may be successfully alleged
against an attorney or law firm. See, e.g., In re Rospatch Securities Litigation,
[1992 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,939 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
39 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191:
The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from
liability under the [S]ecurities Acts. Any person or entity, includ-
ing a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative de-
vice or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary
violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary
liability under Rule 10b-5 are met. In any complex securities fraud,
moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
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now sued as primary violators. A number of courts and the SEC
agree. According to the SEC, an attorney, acting alone or with
others, who "creates" a misrepresentation can be liable as a pri-
mary violator irrespective of whether such attorney (or her law
firm) is identified by name with the subject misrepresentation.4 °
Pursuant to the Sixth Circuit's "direct contacts" test, attorneys
who draft disclosure materials with the expectation that such
materials will be furnished to investors are deemed primary par-
ticipants.41 A third standard provides that attorneys "who signifi-
cantly participate in the creation of their client's
misrepresentations, to such a degree that they may fairly be
deemed authors or co-authors of those misrepresentations,
should be held accountable as primary violators under section
10(b) . . . even when the lawyers . . . are not identified to the
investor. "42
40 See Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae in Klein v. Boyd, at 20, Nos. 97-1143, 97-
1261 (3rd Cir. 1998).
41 See Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1998);
Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991). In Moleculer
Technology, the Sixth Circuit reasoned:
Applying section 10(b)/rule lOb-5 principles to [the attorney] Sny-
der's involvement with the SDE shell transaction leads us to con-
clude that sufficient evidence was introduced to create a triable fact
issue for the jury. Snyder drafted the merger agreement between
State Die and Extra Production at the August 11, 1983 meeting....
At that meeting, Snyder... knew that 60,000 shares (representing
about 90% of the outstanding shares) of State Die stock were in
escrow; Snyder was aware that the title to the real property of State
Die, which was part of the consideration in the merger with Extra
Production, was held by an unrelated leasing company and, thus,
not transferable; Snyder contemplated obtaining State Die's most
recent annual report, a corporate certificate of good standing, tax
returns, etc. (although he never obtained any such documents);
and Snyder knew that State Die had substantial debts, including
one $194,000 bank debt. Snyder did not disclose any of this infor-
mation in the amended offering circular. Taking this evidence in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could
find that Snyder knew certain information in the amended offering
circular was misleading and that Snyder had a duty to disclose that
information to investors such as the plaintiffs under 10(b)/rule
lob-5 ...
Id. at 917-918.
42 Klein v. Boyd, [1998 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 90,136, at
90,324 (3d Cir. 1998), rehearing en banc granted, judgment vacated, [1998 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 90,165 (3rd Cir. 1998).
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An attorney who intentionally drafts fraudulent disclosure
documents on the client's behalf indirectly43 engages in decep-
tive conduct and should be held accountable as a primary viola-
tor.44 To allow an attorney to escape liability to aggrieved
investors for such deliberate misconduct misconstrues the appli-
cable federal statutes and impugns the integrity of the practic-
ing bar.45 Also of importance is that in 1998 Congress enacted
legislation preempting, with certain exceptions, the applicability
of state law in securities class actions involving nationally traded
securities. 46 Hence, federal law may be the only source of re-
dress in this context, thus calling for a flexible interpretation of
the pertinent statutory framework.
This essay seeks to set forth a cogent rationale accommodat-
ing the competing interests at stake. The success of our private
and public capital markets is owed in large measure to the integ-
rity and expertise of the corporate and securities bar. It be-
hooves the bar therefore to oppose policies and proposals that
provide shelter to their inept or corrupt brethren. The public
certainly deserves as much. I believe that Professor Walter
Steele would agree.
43 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act makes it unlawful "for any per-
son, directly or indirectly... [t]o use or employ.., any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (emphasis added). See Central
Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
44 See SEC Brief, supra note 40, at 12 (asserting that "[a] person who creates a
misrepresentation, but takes care not to be identified publicly with it, 'indirectly'
uses or employs a deceptive device or contrivance and should be liable").
45 See id. at 12-20. See also, Lincoln Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp.
901 (D.D.C. 1990); sources cited notes 1-4, 40-44 supra.
46 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353
(Nov. 3, 1998). See H.R. Rep. No. 105-803, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). See
generally Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to State Court: The Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 141 (1999); David M. Levine & Adam
C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on
California's Blue Sky Laws, 54 Bus. LAw. 1 (1998); Richard W. Painter, Responding to
a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 86 COR-
NELL L. Rv. 1 (1998).
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